In Frisch 2004 and 2005 I showed that the standard ways of modeling particle-field interactions in classical electrodynamics, which exclude the interactions of a particle with its own field, results in a formal inconsistency, and I argued that attempts to include the selffield lead to numerous conceptual problems. In this paper I respond to criticism of my 
Introduction
A fundamental problem in classical electrodynamics (CED) is how to incorporate the interaction of a charged particle with its own electromagnetic field into the theory. The standard equations used to model particle-field interactions simply ignore self-interactions.
This results in a formal inconsistency, as I show in Frisch 2004 and Frisch 2005 . While there also exist numerous proposals for including self-interactions, these proposals either crucially rely on approximations or are otherwise conceptually problematic. I discuss several such proposals in Frisch 2005 , arguing that the manner in which foundational problems are treated in CED has implications for our philosophical understanding of scientific theorizing.
My account is criticized by Gordon Belot (2007) , Fred Muller (2007) , and also by Peter Vickers (forthcoming). Muller argues that my argument for the inconsistency of the standard modeling assumptions is flawed and claims that any putative problems of the theory have been solved. Belot and Vickers agree with me that the assumptions at issue are indeed inconsistent but question the philosophical conclusions I want to draw from this fact. In this paper I respond to Muller's and Belot's criticisms, beginning with a few remarks concerning the issue of inconsistency.
1 Contrary to Muller's claim, the argument I presented is valid, yet I am inclined the agree with my critics that this inconsistency in itself is less telling than my previous discussions may have suggested. I then briefly rehearse some of the theory's conceptual problems and argue that while there are indeed solutions to these problems, they offer no solace to defenders of traditional philosophical conceptions of scientific theorizing.
Inconsistency

4
In Frisch 2004 and Frisch 2005 I explained that the models physicists use to represent classical interactions between discrete charged particles and electromagnetic fields fall into two classes-(1) models in which the trajectory of a charge or current configuration is assumed as given and the fields produced by the charges and currents are calculated (Muller calls these "A problems" (262)); and (2) models where external fields are given, and the motions of charges in the external fields are calculated (Muller's "B problems") . Crucially, models of the second kind treat charged particles as being influenced by external fields alone, even though, according to models of the first kind, each charge itself also contributes to the total field. That is to say, any effect that the field produced by a charge may have on the motion of the charge itself is ignored. I showed that ignoring the so-called 'self-fields' in the charge's equation of motion results in a formal inconsistency: the equation of motion for discrete charges without self-fields-what we may call 'the external Lorentz-force equation of motion'-is inconsistent with the Maxwell equations and the standard principle of energymomentum conservation (which together imply that accelerated charges radiate energy).
2
Contrary to Muller's somewhat tortured reconstruction of my argument, the argument begins with the assumption that the only electromagnetic force acting on a charged particle is the force due to the external fields (which is the assumption made in all applications of classical electrodynamics), and under this assumption the argument I presented is valid.
3
What ought we to conclude from the fact that the assumptions made in modeling Aand B-problems are inconsistent? Belot (2007) argues that this inconsistency is of less philosophical relevance than I have made it out to be, since it is only an instance of the wide-5 spread and well-known phenomenon of the use of idealizing assumptions that are strictlyspeaking inconsistent with an underlying fully consistent theory that includes selfinteractions. 4 Yet in my earlier discussions I took the inconsistency of the standard modeling assumptions paired with their empirical successfulness to be telling precisely because, as I
argued, there appears to be no classical treatment of self-interactions that is both exact and conceptually entirely unproblematic. That is, approximations in CED do not appear to be approximations to an underlying 'well-behaved' and exact classical theory. My ultimate aim was to argue that a range of formal philosophical conceptions of scientific theories are misguided. Much of scientific theorizing that is interesting, I argued, does not fit well into the formal straight-jackets of the philosophers' design-be it one that construes theories syntactically as a deductively closed set of sentences in some formal language or one that reconstructs theories in terms of set-theoretic structures. While I still take my ultimate conclusion to be correct that CED fits ill with traditional philosophical accounts of theorizing, I am now inclined to agree with my critics that it may have been a mistake to place the inconsistency of the standard modeling assumption at the center of my discussion. 6 This way of framing the discussion directed attention away from what is arguably the philosophically more interesting issue: the fact that a host of conceptual problems arises when one tries to develop a classical theory of charged particles interacting with electromagnetic fields in a way that includes self-interaction effects; and it is this issue to which I want to turn next.
Conceptual Problems
The aim of "theories of the electron''-i.e., theories of microscopic charged particles with self-interactions-as Arthur Yaghjian puts it in his monograph, is "to determine an equation of motion for […] the electron that is consistent with causal solutions to the Maxwell-Lorentz equations, the relativistic generalization of Newton's second law of motion, and Einstein's mass-energy relation." (Yaghjian 2006, 1) That is, we begin with an assumption about the background spacetime in which particles and fields live-the relativistic assumption that
Muller calls the "Space Time Postulate"-dynamical laws governing the propagation of particles and fields, and conceptual constraints on acceptable solutions, such as causal assumptions or the principle of energy-momentum conservation. We then try to find a model of a discrete charged particle that results in an equation of motion for the particle satisfying these assumptions as much as possible.
In Frisch there is an exact, fully satisfactory classical theory-a "full theory of classical electrodynamics"-lurking in the background to which the many ingenious solutions can be considered as approximations.
According to the traditional philosophers' view, a successful theory, which can be formalized either syntactically or set-theoretically, provides us, at least in principles, with models or exact solutions for all the phenomena in its domain. Hence, a successful classical electrodynamics ought to be able to tell us a consistent, complete, and exact 'in principle' story of the detailed mutual interactions between charges and fields. However, CED does not appear to provide us with such a story. proposal, governs a distinct 'patch' of phenomena. Belot concedes that we need to add principles to our two theories that tell us only to look for solutions to each theory on its own (to prevent logical mayhem), but he maintains that the addition of such principles constitutes nothing novel, since they merely serve to restrict the domain of the theories' applicability:
We can get away with thinking of each of these theories as determining its class of models in the usual way-i.e., as generating the set of solutions to the equation of the theory. We will of course need further principles that demarcate the domain of applicability of each theory-but every non-fundamental theory involves such principles. (Belot 2007, 279-80, italics Third, not in all applications are the two 'sub-theories' applied to distinct sets of phenomena. There are contexts in which we are interested both in the effect of the fields on the motion of a charge and in the fields produced by that charge and in these contexts we need to appeal to the full resources of both sub-theories. Models of synchrotron radiation are one example where we feed the results obtained from one sub-theory as input into the other (and hence need to be careful about the relations between the different steps in our calculation). Other examples are models of self-interactions. All three worries can presumably be met by invoking substantive interpretive principles governing the applications of the two theories, but the more we need to rely on such additional assumptions, the less our account will still resemble the traditional philosopher's axiomatic reconstruction.
As Muller characterizes the situation, I have claimed that the self-energy problem "[defies] resolution," (253) while he has argued that the problem has in fact been solved. But it is important to realize that the question whether or not the self-energy problem has been solved has no unequivocal answer. Whether we take a solution to be successful depends crucially on the purpose it is meant to serve and on what we take the conditions of adequacy for solutions to be. The philosophers' view of theories requires that a solution be part of an axiomatizable account covering the phenomenon at issue and that there be an in principle exact solution backing up any approximation we make. On a view such as Wilson's or my own, a solution can be successful, even if it relies essentially on approximations. But not only do the traditional philosophers' conception of scientific theories and conceptions that are arguably closer to scientific practice disagree on the appropriate conditions of adequacy, physicists also disagree amongst themselves on the merits of certain solutionsdisagreements that appear to be due to differences in how much weight is assigned to various conceptual constraints on classical theories.
Thus, on the one hand some physicists think that ultimately none of the solutions to the self-energy problem are fully satisfactory. Richard Feynman, for example, said:
This tremendous edifice, which is such a beautiful success in explaining so many phenomena, ultimately falls on its face. When you follow any of our physics too far, you find that you always get into some kind of trouble. Now we want to discuss a serious trouble-the failure of classical electromagnetic limited areas, can be given, the basic problem remains unsolved." (Jackson 1999, 745) 10 On the other hand there are those who believe that, from the physicists' perspective, the theory's problems have been solved. In the most recent edition of his classic text Fritz Rohrlich claims that the remaining difficulties for solutions to the self-energy problem have finally been overcome and that we now know the "physically correct dynamics" of a classical charged particle (Rohrlich 2007, vii) .
Here is not the place for another extended survey of treatments of self-energy effects, nevertheless I want to make some brief remarks to support the view I sketched above.
Broadly, models of particle-field interactions fall into two classes, depending on whether the theories treat charged particles as point particles or as extended particles. A first problem for 13 point-particle theories is that the electromagnetic field of a finitely-charged point particle is infinite at the location of the charge. As I discuss in Frisch 2005 (59-63) , there is a wellknown strategy for handling this particular problem even within the point-particle framework. The core idea is to 'renormalize' the mass of the charged particle-that is, to treat part of the diverging self-field of the charge as contributing to the mass of the particle, which nevertheless can be made finite overall by positing a negative and equally diverging non-electromagnetic 'bare mass.'
The procedure of mass renormalization provides us with a nice example of how different standards of success can come apart. While the procedure is mathematically welldefined and arguably even provides us with an exact solution to the self-energy problem, solutions to the resulting equation of motion are generally viewed by physicists to be conceptually deeply problematic and in addition do not fit into formal philosophical reconstructions of theories, such as the set-theoretic account favored by Muller.
Muller argues that while it may initially appear that "point-particles fall outside the domain of CED" (267, italics in original), the renormalization program shows that "models of point particles fit within CED," (268) show that "models of point particles fit within CED" in the sense required by the Muller's settheoretic reconstruction.
Physicists have worries about the renormalized equation of motion different from the preceding one. Herbert Spohn, for example, says that "while the mere mathematical operation [of mass renormalization] is admissible, it would result in a theory with very little physical content." (Spohn 2004, 146 ) By far the most frequently expressed worry about the Lorentz-Dirac equation is that it permits acausal solutions which either allow a free charge to accelerate, even though it never experiences any external force, or predict that a charge's acceleration at t depends on the external forces applied to the charge at all times later than t (see Frisch 2005, 59-63) . The first problem can be solved, but the second problem-the problem of pre-acceleration-remains. 11 A further worry about the Lorentz-Dirac equation
is that there are no general existence and uniqueness proofs for systems consisting of two or more charged particles, and the two-particle systems that have been studied exhibit rather problematic behavior (see Parrott 1987, sec. 5.5 ).
Rohrlich, as we have seen, argues that, from a physicist's perspective, the conceptual problems besetting the renormalization program have been solved. He reports that if we introduce a cutoff into the theory for small length scales, we can replace the problematic Lorentz-Dirac equation with a 'regularized' equation of motion that exhibit none of the conceptually problematic behavior of the Lorentz-Dirac equation itself. 12 The procedure is justified empirically by arguing that the classical theory becomes empirically inadequate at very small distances anyway. This is an instance where approximations play a crucial role.
Even though the acausal and temporally non-local behavior of the exact point particle equation is viewed as problematic, the renormalization program's procedure of extending the resources of classical electrodynamics to account for the charge's self-interactions is ultimately judged to be successful, since there exists a formally and empirically wellmotivated approximation to the exact equation that is well-behaved in ways in which the exact equation is not. While this verdict makes little sense on the traditional philosophers' conception of theories, it fits well with a view that allows for physical theories to have weak spots that can be treated rigorously yet not exactly with the theory's resources.
The second approach to the self-energy problem models charged particles as extended particles. This was the dominant approach in the early twentieth century and recently once 16 again appears to have become the main focus of research on classical theories of the electron.
Extended-particle models provide an example of a phenomenon that Wilson calls "foundational looping" (Wilson 2006, 195) and which occurs when a putatively more fundamental, lower-level theory or model is in turn accounted for with the help of the resources of the higher-level theory. Microscopic electrodynamics allows us to explain the bulk properties of a macroscopic medium-such as the electric permittivity ε and the magnetic permeability µ-in terms of the interaction between microscopic elementary charged particles and microscopic fields propagating in vacuum. The macro-properties are derived from the microscopic theory by modeling charges as structureless point particles and averaging over the charge density (see Jackson 1999, 6 .6). Extended-particle models, however, treat the 'elementary' electron much like a miniature version of the macroscopic objects whose behavior it is meant to explain. Yaghjian, for example, models the electron as a spherical insulator with a uniformly distributed surface charge e (2006, 2) and, thus, needs to address the question as to what the permittivity and permeability of the insulator are. That is, the putatively reducible macro-properties have reappeared on the micro-level.
13
The extended-particle model that is best understood-the Abraham model-treats charges as rigid and spherically symmetric in a preferred reference frame-the laboratory frame. The repulsive forces between different charge elements are taken to be counteracted by not-further-specified cohesive forces. Even models that treat charged particles as so-called relativistically rigid objectsthat is objects, that always have the same shape in their instantaneous rest frames-are not fully relativistic since they allow for superluminal propagation. (A fully relativistic extended particle would be dented when it experiences an external forces and would have to have vibrational degrees of freedom.) Also, there are to date no global existence and uniqueness proofs for solutions to the particle-field equations for relativistically rigid charges and there are considerations that suggest that such a proof may not be possible. (See Spohn 2004, ch. 5, especially p. 30) Thus, the extension program, too, offers at best approximate solutions to the problem of arriving at a fully relativistic classical particle-field theory. 
Conclusion
One lesson we can learn from the history of classical particle-field theories is that there is a tension between the notion of discrete particle and relativistic field theories. On the one hand, structureless point particles fit more naturally into a relativistic theory than extended objects, but they result in infinities, which can be 'tamed' only with difficulty, and lead to other conceptual problems that can be resolved at most in some approximation regime. On the other hand, no extended-particle model that has been explored in any detail is fully Belot concedes that the fact that we do not know how to reconcile extended particles with
Lorentz-invariance provides good reasons for preferring point-particle models (2007, 276 ), yet he also says that the point-particle model "leads to various well-known difficulties" (2007, 266 ; see also 267). While Muller insists that despite these difficulties the self-energy problem has been solved, he emphasizes that "approximations are mandatory" in these solutions. But then Belot and Muller ought also to agree with the following conclusion: No matter how successful the solutions "at various levels of sophistication and rigor" may be from a physicists' perspective, they offer no support to the traditional philosophers' conception of successful scientific theories as axiomatizable accounts that provide us with fully coherent and complete world pictures.
